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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PAUL BLACKNER, 
Plaintiff- Appellant, 
v. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, et al., 
Defendants - Appellees. 
CaseNo.20000906-SC 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT - APPELLEE THE STATE OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION and UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This matter comes within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0 (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Plaintiffs alleged injuries arose out of, and were the results of, avalanches that 
were caused by natural conditions on publicly owned lands. For this reason, the trial 
court correctly held that the defendants were entitled to immunity under Utah Code Ann. 
§63-30-10(11) (1996). 
This issue was raised by the defendants in their motions for summary judgment 
(R. 158-61, 180) and the trial court granted these motions, in part, based upon this issue 
(R.281). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court granted the defendants' motions for 
summary judgment for this reason, as well as on the grounds raised by the plaintiff in his 
opening brief. R. 281. This Court can consider such matters even though raised for the 
first time by the appellees. Brown v. Glover. 2000 UT 89,1J24,16 P.3d 540; Buehner 
Block Co. v. UWC Assoc, 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988); State v. South. 924 P.2d 
354, 355 n.3 (Utah 1996). 
2. Plaintiffs alleged injuries arose out of and were the results of the efforts to 
control and manage avalanches, which constitute a natural disaster. For this reason, the 
trial court correctly held that the defendants were entitled to immunity under Utah Code 
Ann. §63-30-10(13) (1996). 
This issue was raised by the defendants in their motions for summary judgment 
(R. 158-61,180-81) and the trial court granted these motions, in part, based upon this 
issue (R. 281). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was decided below upon the defendants1 
motions for summary judgment. Reviewing the trial court's grant of a motion for 
summary judgment "includes a determination of whether the trial court correctly applied 
governing law, affording no deference to the trial court's determination or conclusions of 
law." Burton v. Exam Ctr. Indus. & Gen. Med. Clinic, Inc.. 2000 UT 18, ^4, 994 P.2d 
1261; Gardner v. Perry City. 2000 UT App 1, ^ [6, 994 P.2d 811. MIn matters of pure 
statutory interpretation, an appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling for correctness and 
2 
gives no deference to its legal conclusions." Stephens v. Bonneville Travel. Inc.. 935 
P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-2-102 Definitions. (1993) 
(2) "Disaster" means a situation causing, or threatening to cause, 
widespread damage, social disruption, or injury or loss of life or property 
resulting from attack, internal disturbance, natural phenomena, or 
technological hazard. 
(8) "Natural phenomena" means any earthquake, tornado, storm, flood, 
landslide, avalanche, forest or range fire, drought, or epidemic. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 Waiver of immunity for injury caused by 
negligent act or omission of employee - Exceptions. (1996) 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee 
committed within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out 
of, in connection with, or results from: 
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, any 
condition existing in connection with an abandoned mine or mining 
operation, or any activity authorized by the School and Institutional Trust 
Lands Administration or the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Paul Blackner filed this action originally against the State of Utah, Department of 
Transportation and the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT).1 R. 1-6. Plaintiff 
1
 While listing the State of Utah's Department of Transportation in the caption of 
both the original complaint and the amended complaint as if it were two entities, the 
plaintiff has consistently, both on appeal and in the trial court, treated this doubly named 
3 
was later permitted to amend his complaint so as to add the Town of Alta as a defendant 
to this action. R. 137-41. Blackner alleged that he had been seriously injured as the 
result of an avalanche. Plaintiff claimed that his injuries resulted from the negligence of 
UDOT and Alta employees in their treatment of a prior avalanche and the danger of 
further avalanches in the canyon that day. IcL 
Both UDOT and the Town of Alta filed motions for summary judgment. R. 152-
67, 175-94. Both motions for summary judgment were based on the retention of 
governmental immunity for injuries arising out of, in connection with, or resulting from 
any natural condition on publicly owned land and for the management of natural disasters. 
Utah Code. Ann. § 63-30-10 (11) & (13) (1996).2 
After oral argument (R. 294), the trial court entered its order granting summary 
judgment for the defendants on the grounds that they were entitled to immunity on both of 
the above-raised grounds on October 16, 2000. R. 280-82. The plaintiff filed his notice 
of appeal on October 23, 2000. R. 286-87. 
defendant as if it were a single defendant and entity. R. 1-6, 137-41. 
2
 UDOT's motion was also based on the retention of immunity for activities 
relating to emergency evacuations. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (18) (1996). The trial 
court did not grant summary judgment based on this provision of the statute and this issue 
is not before the Court on appeal. 
4 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The following numbered facts are taken from the Town of Altafs motion for 
summary judgment. The plaintiff expressly accepted these facts to be true for the purpose 
of both defendants1 motions for summary judgment. R. 229. 
1. On March 14,1998, an avalanche occurred in Little Cottonwood 
Canyon, near Alta, Utah, in an area known as the White Pine Chutes, which 
is situated north (across the canyon road) from Tanner's Flat Campground 
and White Pine Fork. 
2. The avalanche partially covered the canyon road and blocked vehicles 
traveling in the downhill lane. 
3. The avalanche was first spotted by Snowbird personnel atop Hidden 
Peak, who then reported the occurrence to Alta's Central Dispatch Office. 
In turn, Kevin Payne, a Deputy Marshal for the Town of Alta, was notified 
of the avalanche and arrived at the scene approximately three minutes later. 
4. Upon arrival at the scene, Deputy Payne became concerned that vehicles 
in both the uphill and downhill lanes would attempt to drive around the 
obstacle and collide head on. Therefore, he began to control traffic around 
the avalanche debris by directing each lane of traffic to take turns using the 
open lane. 
5. In order to remove the debris from the road, a front-end loader was 
dispatched from the Snowbird Ski Area and arrived approximately 15 
minutes later. When the front-end loader arrived, it began to push 
avalanche debris off the side of the road. While the loader was working, 
traffic could not safely negotiate around both the loader and the debris. 
Therefore, vehicles in both lanes of travel were stopped to allow the loader 
to clear the road. 
6. Approximately five to ten minutes after the loader began to clear the 
debris, Deputy Payne received a radio call from Mr. Dave Madera, UDOT's 
avalanche forecaster on duty that day. Mr. Madera explained that he was in 
one of the vehicles waiting in the uphill lane and he had begun to worry 
about the safety of his location and asked how much longer the loader 
would be working. Deputy Payne advised Mr. Madera that the loader was 
taking its last scoop. Several seconds later, another avalanche tumbled onto 
the road and struck some of the vehicles stopped in the uphill lane, 
including plaintiffs vehicle and Mr. Madera's vehicle, pushing several 
5 
vehicles off the road and into the east end of the Tanner's Flat Campground. 
7. Plaintiff was injured as a result of the second avalanche. 
The area north of the canyon road, including the While Pine Chutes where 
both avalanches originated, is public land designated as the Twins Peaks 
Wilderness Area, which is managed by the National Forest Service as part 
of the Wasatch-Cache National Forest. 
R. 177-79 (citations to exhibits in the record have been omitted). 
Paul Blackner alleged in his Amended Complaint that he was stopped because 
UDOT and Town of Alta employees were "engaged in moving, controlling, and directing 
those who became trapped in the avalanche, or were on the road in the canyon." R. 138. 
Plaintiff further admitted in his amended complaint that previous avalanches at this 
location had caused fatalities. R. 139. The first avalanche had blocked half of the road. 
R. 165. There had been other avalanches in the canyon that day, but the others had not 
reached the roadway. Id The two avalanches relevant to this action were the result of 
natural causes and not of any avalanche control efforts. R. 166. Many people, including 
the plaintiff and a UDOT employee, were caught in the second avalanche. IdL These 
avalanches were natural disasters that could not have been predicted. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff was injured by an avalanche. The avalanche was caused by the slippage 
of naturally occurring snow that was on publicly owned land. At the time of the incident, 
the plaintiff was waiting on a public state road for the debris left from a previous 
avalanche to be cleared away so that the road could be reopened. His injuries arose out 
of, in connection with, or resulted from a natural condition on publicly owned land. In 
6 
the same manner, his injuries were related to efforts by two government entities to 
manage a natural disaster (both avalanches). For these reasons the trial court correctly 
found that the defendants were entitled to immunity and dismissed this action. UDOT 
urges this Court to affirm the trial court's decision. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES AROSE OUT OF, IN 
CONNECTION WITH OR RESULTED FROM A 
NATURAL CONDITION ON PUBLIC LAND 
In the lower court, the plaintiff stipulated that he was injured by an avalanche 
created and caused by the condition of the snow on land owned and operated by the U.S. 
Forest Service. The undisputed fact is that the avalanche was caused naturally and was 
not the product of any human intervention. The trial court correctly ruled that these facts 
showed that the plaintiffs injuries arose out of, in connection with or resulted from a 
natural condition on public land. 
As was the case in Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist.% 849 P.2d 1162,1164 (Utah 
1993), the issue of whether the plaintiff could state a valid tort cause of action was not 
addressed by the defendants' motions for summary judgment. Instead, the sole issue 
raised was whether immunity had been retained under several provisions of the 
Governmental Immunity Act. Plaintiffs opening brief conflates the unrelated issues of 
whether immunity has been retained and whether a duty was owed by these defendants to 
7 
the plaintiff and was breached. This Court has clearly stated that these are distinct issues 
and should not so intermingled. Ledfors, 849 P.2d at 1163-64. 
Further, in interpreting the Governmental Immunity Act, this Court has stated that 
it should be strictly applied so as to preserve sovereign immunity. Taylor v. Ogden Sch. 
Dist. 927 P.2d 159,162 (Utah 1996). 
A. Plaintiffs opening brief misrepresents that this issue was not addressed below. 
In his opening brief, the plaintiff misrepresents to this Court the grounds upon 
which the trial court made its decision to grant the defendants' motions for summary 
judgment. Plaintiff mistakenly claims that the trial court "confined its ruling to the 
question of whether the Appellees were involved in the 'management of a natural disaster' 
while clearing the snow from avalanche No. 1" and that this was "the singular basis for 
the lower court's ruling as established by the record below." Brief of Appellant at 8 and 
10. 
Even a quick reading of the trial court's order of dismissal (entitled "Summary 
Judgment") demonstrates that it was based both on immunity for injuries arising from the 
management of a natural disaster (Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (13) (1996)) and on 
immunity for injuries arising from a natural condition upon publicly owned land (Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-10(11) (1996)). R. 281. The lower court's decision expressly states 
"[tjhat the defendants respective motions for summary judgments are granted pursuant to 
U.C.A. § 63-30-10(11) and (13)." R. 281, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
8 
Addendum A. Plaintiff has failed to address in his opening brief one of the two grounds 
upon which the trial court based its decision to dismiss this action. Nor does the citation 
to the oral argument transcript, relied upon by the plaintiff in his mistaken claim that the 
trial court did not dismiss this action upon the grounds of immunity arising out of a 
natural condition on publicly owned land, support his representations. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
The Court is going to grant the motion for summary judgment for both 
Department of Transportation and the City of Alta. It's the Court's view in 
examining the applicable statute that though there's certainly some basis for 
discussion - and I think Plaintiff has done an excellent job of raising the 
other way of examining this, it's the Court's view that the intention as 
communicated by the legislature in this statute is that - that the avalanche is 
a natural phenomenon, it is certainly a natural condition of the land and that 
the - a disaster is a situation that causes widespread damage to property that 
results from natural phenomenon. And in the Court's view this sort of 
condition would follow in the description of "widespread damage" and 
would therefore be within the statute and would allow the immunity to the 
entities that are sued here as the Defendants. 
R. 294, page 16 (emphasis added). 
B. Plaintiffs injuries were caused by a natural condition on public land. 
This Court has applied a three step approach to determining whether or not 
immunity is applicable to a specific case. Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist. 849 P.2d 
1162, 1164 (Utah 1993). The first step is to determine whether the activity performed by 
the entity is a governmental function. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act grants 
immunity to governmental entities in their exercise of governmental functions. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1991). In the instant action, plaintiff has not disputed on appeal 
9 
that the maintenance of a public road is a governmental function. Indeed, this Court has 
stated that traditionally, such activity has always been considered governmental. 
McCorvev v. Utah State Dep't of Transp.. 868 P.2d 41,47 (Utah 1993). Further, the 
Immunity Act expressly states that all actions of government (or failures to act) are to be 
considered governmental functions. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4)(a) (1994). 
The second step requires a determination of whether there is a waiver of immunity. 
If such a waiver exists, the third step involves a determination regarding any exceptions to 
the waiver. 
The plaintiff claims that the waiver of immunity found in Utah Code Ann. § 63-
30-10 (1996) is applicable. This statute waives immunity for injuries proximately caused 
by the negligence of government employees, unless the injury "arises out of, in 
connection with, or results from" one of a list of retentions of immunity. One such 
retention in subsection 10 is for injuries arising out of, connected with, or resulting from 
any natural condition on publicly owned land. 
This Court has repeatedly held that the statutory retention of immunity applies 
regardless of the particular type of negligence that the plaintiff may claim, or how the 
plaintiff may style his claims. The important question is not the type of negligence 
alleged, but rather whether the injuries arose out, are connected with or result from a 
natural condition on publicly owned land. In Ledfors, this Court explained: 
Again, our prior cases have looked to whether the injury asserted "arose out 
of1 conduct or a situation specifically described in one of the subparts of 
10 
63-30-10; if it did, then immunity is preserved. We have rejected claims 
that have reflected attempts to evade these statutory categories by 
recharacterizing the supposed cause of the injury 
In sum, the Ledforses ignore the fact that the structure of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, especially section 63-30-10, focuses on the 
conduct or situation out of which the injury arose, not on the theory of 
liability crafted by the plaintiff or the type of negligence alleged. Because 
Richie's injuries arose out of a battery, we cannot ignore the plain meaning 
and fair import of section 63-30-10 of the Act. 
Id. at 1166-67 (citing Sheffield v. Turner. 21 Utah 2d 314, 316,445 P.2d 367, 368 
(1968)). See also Maddocks v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 740 P.2d 1337,1340 (Utah 1987) 
(rejecting argument that assault and battery exception did not apply to claim that two 
police officers negligently failed to intervene to prevent beating of plaintiff by another 
officer). 
This Court reached the same conclusion in Malcolm v. State. 878 P.2d 1144,1146-
47 (Utah 1994); S.H. v. State. 865 P.2d 1363, 1364-65 (Utah 1993); Petersen v. Bd. of 
Educ. 855 P.2d 241, 242-43 (Utah 1993); and Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 
231, 240-41 (Utah 1993). In each of these decisions, this Court reiterated that the 
question of whether the retention of immunities under section 10 are applicable is 
determined not by considering the type of negligence alleged, but rather looking to 
whether or not the complained-of injuries arose out of one of the listed situations or 
conducts found in section 10. 
Finally, in Taylor, this Court expressly defined what was meant by the statutory 
phrase "arose out of." 
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Taylor maintains that the assault exception should not apply because 
Zachary's injuries have a greater link to the dangerous window in the 
restroom than to Trenton's assault. However, "arises out of1 within the 
assault exception M,is a phrase of much broader significance than "caused 
by.t,m Under the phrase's ordinary meaning, the assault need not be the sole 
cause of the injury to except the governmental entity from liability for the 
injury. The language demands ,Monly that there be some causal relationship 
between the injury and the risk"1 provided for. 
Taylor, 927 P.2d at 163 (citations omitted). 
It cannot be disputed that the avalanche that caused the plaintiffs injuries arose out 
of the natural conditions upon public lands. Even if this were not so, the statute gives 
three alternative relationships between the injury and the retentions of immunity of which 
"arises out of1 is only one, "connection with" and "results from" being the others. 
"Connection" is defined as "3. anything that connects; connecting part; link; bond." 
Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language 432 (1996). 
"Result" is defined as "1. to spring, arise, or proceed as a consequence of actions, 
circumstances, premises, etc.; be the outcome." Webster at 1642. 
The avalanche which caused his injuries was clearly "connected with" the natural 
condition upon land owned by the public. The avalanche was caused by the natural 
condition of the land and the naturally occurring snowpack thereon. The cause and effect 
connection between the plaintiffs injuries and this natural condition on publicly owned 
land cannot be disputed. This is more than sufficient to demonstrate a connecting link or 
bond between the natural condition of the publicly owned land and the plaintiffs injuries. 
12 
Further, the plaintiffs injuries clearly "resulted from" the natural conditions upon 
land owned by the public. Again, it cannot be argued but that the injuries in question 
resulted from the natural condition on the publicly owned land. The claimed injuries 
were the consequence, the outcome, of the natural conditions on the publicly owned land. 
Interpreting broadly these two phrases, as this Court explained "arises out off must be 
interpreted in Taylor, makes it clear that the trial court correctly determined that the 
governmental immunity of UDOT had been retained and this action was correctly 
dismissed. 
This is not an action like Nelson by and through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 
P.2d 568 (Utah 1996), in which the government entity had sought to protect against a 
natural condition by building a fence.3 The undisputed fact is that the avalanche could 
not be predicted. The retention of immunity for natural conditions was intended for just 
such conditions that will cause damage and injuries without a real ability on the part of 
the government actor to protect the public user of public lands.-
3
 It must also be noted that Nelson only considered the phrase "arises out of and 
not the other two statutory alternative phrases. Each phrase must be given "a relevant and 
independent meaning so as to give effect to all of [the statute's] terms." V-1 Oil Co. State 
Tax Comm'n. 942 P.2d 906, 917 (Utah 1997). 
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II. PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES AROSE OUT OF, IN 
CONNECTION WITH OR RESULTED FROM THE 
MANAGEMENT OF A NATURAL DISASTER 
The trial court found that avalanches constituted a "natural disaster" under the 
Governmental Immunity Act such that injuries arising out of, in connection with or 
resulting from efforts to manage them were entitled to the retention of governmental 
immunity. In interpreting statutory language, this Court has explained: 
First, our primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the 
legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose 
the statute was meant to achieve. We need look beyond the plain language 
only if we find some ambiguity. "In analyzing a statute's plain language, we 
must attempt to give each part of the provision a relevant and independent 
meaning so as to give effect to all of its terms." However, if we find a 
provision that causes doubt or uncertainty in its application, we must 
"analyze the act in its entirety and 'harmonize its provisions in accordance 
with the legislative intent and purpose/" Nevertheless, a statute's 
unambiguous language "may not be interpreted to contradict its plain 
meaning." 
State v. Burns. 2000 UT 56, f 25, 4 P.3d 795 (citations omitted). 
As already noted, this Court has stated that the legislative intent with regard to the 
Governmental Immunity Act was that it be "strictly applied to preserve sovereign 
immunity." Taylor, 927 P.2d at 162. The plaintiffs injuries arose out of, in connection 
with, or resulted from the two avalanches in question. They arose out of the efforts by the 
defendants to manage those avalanches. While the efforts of the defendants failed, in this 
case, to protect the plaintiff and other members of the public, that does not change the 
14 
fact as to from what circumstances the plaintiffs injuries sprang. Plaintiff claims the trial 
court erred in finding that the avalanches in question were natural disasters. 
UDOT submits that the plain meaning of natural disaster would be any naturally 
occurring event that has the potential to cause damage or loss. Natural is defined as "1. 
existing in or formed by nature, 2. based on the state of things in nature; constituted by 
nature." Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language 1280 
(1996). A disaster is defined as "a calamitous event, esp. one occurring suddenly and 
causing great loss of life, damage, or hardship, as a flood, airplane crash, or business 
failure." Webster's at 561. The avalanches in question meet the normal usage of the 
phrase "natural disaster." The^>laintiff s amended complaint clearly alleges that the 
avalanche zone in question has resulted in fatalities. R. 139. The avalanche that injured 
plaintiff also caused significant other damage as well. For this reason, the trial court 
correctly determined that avalanches are included in the statutory term "natural disaster." 
Plaintiff, without explanation, seeks to import into the Governmental Immunity 
Act the definition of "disaster" found in Utah's Comprehensive Emergency Management 
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 53-2-102(2) and (8) (1993). Even if this definition is applied, the 
avalanches in question clearly meet the statutory test for what would be a natural disaster. 
(2) "Disaster" means.a situation causing, or threatening to cause, 
widespread damage, social disruption, or injury or loss of life or property 
resulting from attack, internal disturbance, natural phenomena, or 
technological hazard. 
(8) "Natural phenomena" means any earthquake, tornado, storm, flood, 
landslide, avalanche, forest or range fire, drought, or epidemic. 
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While situations caused by attack, internal disturbance or technological hazard 
would clearly not meet the test for being a "natural disaster," those caused by "natural 
phenomena" would appear to do so. It is interesting that the legislature thought that 
avalanches were among those "natural phenomena" that it considered to be capable of 
creating a "disaster." This fact supports the trial court's conclusion that the phrase 
"natural disaster" in the Immunity Act should be read to also include avalanches. 
Plaintiff mistakenly claims that the challenged avalanches would not meet the 
definition of "disaster" found in this statute. This is based upon a faulty reading of the 
provisions of the statute. In order to meet the definition of a "disaster," a situation must: 
1) cause or threaten to cause either widespread damage, social disruption, injury, loss of 
life, or loss of property and 2) result from an attack, internal disturbance, natural 
phenomena, or technological hazard. Given the statutory definition of "natural 
phenomena," all avalanches will always meet this second element of the definition of a 
"disaster." 
Both of the avalanches in question also met the first element of the definition. 
While the first avalanche only threatened to cause injury, loss of life or of property, the 
second avalanche actually caused injury and loss of property. The plaintiffs claimed 
injuries either "arose out of1 the attempts to manage these avalanches, "were connected 
with" such management efforts, or "resulted from" such efforts. For this reason the trial 
16 
court was correct when it determined that the retention of immunity for management of 
natural disasters was applicable to the plaintiffs claims, 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons presented above, the trial court's decision, dismissing this action 
with prejudice, should be affirmed. 
DATED this 2 ^ ^ d a y of March, 2001. 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant UDOT 
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m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAULBLACKNER, 
Plaintiff, 
THE STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION, and the 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION and CITY OF 
ALTA, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 990906368 
Judge William B. Bohling 
On Monday, August 28,2000, the defendants' respective Motions for Summary 
Judgment were argued to the Court. The plaintiff appeared in person and was represented by Tad 
D. Draper, Esq. The defendant State of Utah, Department of Transportation was represented by 
Sandra L. Steinvoort, Assistant Attorney General, and the defendant City of Alta was represented 
by David C. Richards, Esq. The Court having reviewed memoranda filed, having heard the 
0028 
argument of counsel, the court having accepted the facts submitted in the memoranda of the 
respective defendants as the plaintiff did not dispute them, and for good cause appearing, now 
and therefore, orders, adjudges and decrees as follows: 
1. That the defendants respective motions for summary judgments are granted 
pursuant to U.C.A § 63-30-10(11) and (13).. 
DATED this 1 ^ day ofSeptember, 2000. 
BY THE COURT 
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